Proposed Indicators to Measure the Environmental Responsibiity of Oil and Gas Companies and Regulatory Reforms to Improve Access to Information about Offshore Drilling by Jacobs, Wendy B. & Joroff, Aladdine D.
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 
Volume 5 
Issue 1 Arctic Special Edition 
6-1-2015 
Proposed Indicators to Measure the Environmental Responsibiity 
of Oil and Gas Companies and Regulatory Reforms to Improve 
Access to Information about Offshore Drilling 
Wendy B. Jacobs 
Aladdine D. Joroff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp 
 Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wendy B. Jacobs & Aladdine D. Joroff, Proposed Indicators to Measure the Environmental Responsibiity 
of Oil and Gas Companies and Regulatory Reforms to Improve Access to Information about Offshore 
Drilling, 5 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 15 (2015). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol5/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy by an authorized 
editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
2015]OFFSHORE DRILLING INDICATORS & REGULATORY REFORMS 15 
PROPOSED INDICATORS TO MEASURE THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY OF OIL AND 
GAS COMPANIES AND REGULATORY REFORMS 
TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT 
OFFSHORE DRILLING 
Wendy B. Jacobs and Aladdine D. Joroff* 
Harvard Law School, Emmett Environmental Law & Policy Clinic 
 
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................... 16 
II. THE NEED FOR PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
AND IMPROVED ACCESS TO INFORMATION .......... 26 
III.     SELECTION OF INDICATORS ..................................... 28 
A.  LEADING INDICATORS ......................................... 29 
1.  Personal Surveys Regarding Operator’s 
Safety and Environmental Management 
System .................................................................. 29 
Definition................................................................... 29 
Why are such surveys useful indicators? ............ 31 
How will the necessary information be 
obtained? ........................................................ 32 
2. Safety and Pollution Prevention Equipment 
Maintenance Backlog ........................................... 33 
Definition................................................................... 33 
Why is this a useful indicator? ............................ 34 
How will the necessary information be 
obtained? ........................................................ 34 
3. Air Pollution ......................................................... 35 
Definition ............................................................. 35 
Why is this a useful indicator? ............................ 36 
How will the necessary information be 
obtained? ........................................................ 37 
B. INTERMEDIATE INDICATORS ............................. 37 
1. Civil and Administrative Violations .................... 37 
Definition ............................................................. 37 
Why is this a useful indicator? ............................ 38 
How will the necessary information be 
obtained? ........................................................ 38 
2. Kick Frequency and Kick Response Time ........... 39 
Definition ............................................................. 39 
Why are these useful indicators? ......................... 39 
How will the necessary information be 
obtained? ........................................................ 40 
C. LAGGING INDICATORS ......................................... 41 
 
1
Jacobs and Joroff: Proposed Indicators to Measure the Environmental Responsibiity of
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2015
16 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:1 
1. Loss of Primary Containment Events ................. 41 
Definition ............................................................. 41 
Why is this a useful indicator? ............................ 42 
How will the necessary information be 
obtained? ........................................................ 43 
2. Oil Releases .......................................................... 44 
Definition ............................................................. 44 
Why is this a useful indicator? ............................ 44 
How will the necessary information be 
obtained? ........................................................ 44 
3. Work-Related Fatalities and Reportable 
Injuries ................................................................. 47 
Definition ............................................................. 47 
Why are these useful indicators? ......................... 47 
How will the necessary information be 
obtained? ........................................................ 47 
IV.SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS .............. 48 
V.ANALYSIS OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ..................... 48 
A. UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTED PUBLIC 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO 
EVALUATLING SAFETY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS ..................................... 49 
1. Restrictions Arising from Unclear 
Regulations .......................................................... 49 
2. Restrictions Arising from Logistical Issues ......... 52 
B. BSEE’S REGULATIONS REQUIRE 
COLLABORATION AMONG AGENCIES BUT 
DO NOT MANDATE INFORMATION-
SHARING .................................................................. 56 
VI.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING ACCESS 
TO INFORMATION ........................................................ 60 
A. ISSUE GUIDANCE CLARIFYING THAT BSEE 
ADOPTS A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF 
DISCLOSURE ........................................................... 60 
B. FACILITATE PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION THROUGH 30 C.F.R. PART 
250 BY AMENDING BSEE FORMS ........................ 61 
C. DEVELOP A SEARCHABLE ONLINE 
DATABASE THAT AGGREGATES OPERATOR 
SUMBITTED INFORMATION ................................ 63 
VII.CONCLUSION ................................................................... 66 
I.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Arctic presents formidable challenges for offshore 
drilling, including “extreme cold, varying forms and amount of 
sea ice, seasonal darkness, high winds, extended periods of 
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heavy fog, and week-long storms that approach hurricane 
strength.”1 The demanding physical conditions in the Arctic can 
be expected to “both heighten the risk of an oil spill and limit 
the effectiveness of oil spill response operations.”2 
Compounding these challenges is the fact that the Arctic is 
remote and far from the critical resources, infrastructure, and 
supplies needed to clean up chemical spills and releases. For 
these reasons, before the offshore oil and gas drilling industry 
expands into U.S. waters off the coast of Alaska,3 more 
information about the companies proposing to drill in the 
Arctic is needed for informed decision making, meaningful 
public input, and effective oversight of operator performance in 
this particularly challenging and environmentally significant 
setting.4 
* Wendy B. Jacobs is a Clinical Professor and Director of the Emmett Environmental 
Law & Policy Clinic at Harvard Law School. Aladdine D. Joroff joined the Clinic in 
2013 as a Staff Attorney after practicing law for ten years. This article represents the 
culmination of several semesters of work in the Clinic by a number of students under 
Professor Jacobs’ supervision. Students who contributed research, analysis and 
writing to the papers on which this article is based include the following current or 
recently-graduated students: David Baake; Daniel Brasil Becker; Elisabeth Costa; 
Maria Parra-Orlandoni; Ephraim Olson; Mary Schnoor; and Jocelyn Sedlet. 
1. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, 
Offshore Drilling in the Arctic: Background and Issues for the Future Consideration of 
Oil and Gas Activities 10 (Staff Working Paper No. 13, 2011) [hereinafter NATIONAL 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER]. 
2. Id. 
3. Current plans for drilling in the U.S. Arctic are limited and recent attempts have 
encountered significant obstacles. See, e.g., Richard Milne et al, Oil Companies Put 
Arctic Projects into Deep Freeze, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015 (“[A] combination of political 
sensitivities and unfavourable economics in the Arctic has encouraged US oil groups to 
focus on more attractive opportunities . . .”); McKenzie Funk, The Wreck of the Kulluk, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 30, 2014 (detailing problems Shell encountered during drilling 
activities in 2012); Guy Chazan, Total Warns Against Oil Drilling in Arctic, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012 (reporting Total SA’s position that energy companies should not 
drill for crude in Arctic waters because “the risk of an oil spill in such an 
environmentally sensitive area was simply too high.”). 
4. See e.g., EMMETT ENVTL L. & POL’Y CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED OVERSIGHT OF OFFSHORE DRILLING BASED ON A 
REVIEW OF 40 REGULATORY (June 2012); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, ARCTIC 
STANDARDS: RECOMMENDATIONS ON OIL SPILL PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND SAFETY IN 
THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN (Sept. 2013) (“[T]he [Ocean Energy Safety Advisory] 
committee concluded that there is a need to modernize U.S. regulations to include 
Arctic-specific standards . . .” ); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer 
Continental Shelf— Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer 
Continental Shelf, 80 Fed. Reg. 9916 (Feb. 24, 2015) (proposing Arctic-specific 
operational standards for drilling related activities in the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi 
Sea Planning Areas). 
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This paper suggests a set of indicators to evaluate and 
predict the environmental performance of companies proposing 
to drill for oil or gas in the U.S. Arctic and recommends 
mechanisms for improving public access to, and intra- and 
inter-agency sharing of, information from companies engaged 
in offshore drilling. We use the term “performance indicator” to 
refer to an observable metric that correlates with an aspect of 
an operator’s performance that is either too difficult to measure 
directly, or too broad to be reduced to a single, precisely 
quantifiable metric.5 Performance indicators can be used to 
compare an operator’s performance in a particular year against 
its performance in previous years or against average industry 
performance.6 
The performance indicators presented here are intended to 
provide a comprehensive portrait of an operator’s 
environmental performance. We selected indicators drawn from 
all aspects of offshore oil and gas operations, including 
exploration, drilling, production, and product transportation, 
and focused on both the risk of catastrophic accidents and 
environmental impacts that occur during the course of normal 
operations. The collection of suggested indicators, which draws 
from indicators that are used by other nations or industry 
groups, is large enough to be comprehensive, but small enough 
to permit effective tracking. We selected indicators for which 
data is available, or reasonably easy to acquire, but in doing so 
recognized existing limitations on access to relevant data. This 
paper identifies barriers to information access and recommends 
ways to overcome these barriers. 
Much of the information that is important for evaluating—
and minimizing—safety and environmental risks is already 
collected by various government agencies from companies 
participating in offshore drilling in the United States. That 
information, however, is not readily accessible by the public, or 
even routinely shared among various interested agencies. 
5. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS RELATED TO CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION, 
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 5 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter OECD Guidance] (“The 
term ‘indicators’ is used to mean observable measures that provide insight into a 
concept – safety – that is difficult to measure directly.”). 
6. See Ian Whewell, Performance Indicators in Major Hazard Industries—An 
Offshore Regulator’s Perspective 8 (2012), available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/ 
0xoqT9KTsTm [hereinafter CHEM. SAFETY BD. PUB. HEARING]. 
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Although various federal agencies collect a significant amount of 
information about offshore drilling operations, limited access to 
such information impairs the ability of stakeholders (such as 
host communities, investors, regulators, advocacy groups, 
academics, and members of the general public) to efficiently and 
effectively evaluate and influence the significant safety and 
environmental impacts of offshore drilling.7 
In particular, we examined the accessibility of information 
currently collected by the Department of the Interior’s (“DOI”) 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”) 
due to BSEE’s central role in overseeing offshore safety and 
environmental protection.8 Despite the creation of BSEE and 
the adoption of the Safety and Environmental Management 
System (“SEMS”) regulations in the wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon spill, stakeholders still lack adequate access to 
critically important information about safety and 
environmental performance. 
This paper highlights several obstacles to public and agency 
access to the information reported to BSEE under its 
regulations (30 C.F.R. Part 250, or the “Regulations”). For 
instance, although the Regulations allow public access to some 
of the information submitted on BSEE forms (§ 250.197(a)), the 
forms cover only a portion of the information submitted to, and 
relied upon by, BSEE in considering a company’s safety and 
environmental impacts. Information that is submitted to BSEE 
in formats other than an agency form should also be accessible 
to the public, but the time and effort it takes to access such 
information frustrates meaningful public oversight of safety 
and environmental impacts. In addition, such access may be 
subject to BSEE determinations of “necessity” of access, further 
shielding from public review information relevant to assessing 
safety and environmental risks. 
Moreover, many documents relevant to evaluating the safety 
and environmental performance of offshore operators are not 
7. Operators may also benefit from shared information that informs performance 
indicators by integrating them into their managerial control systems. See Paolo Perego 
& Frank Hartmann, Aligning Performance Measurement Systems With Strategy: The 
Case of Environmental Strategy, 45 ABACUS 397 (2009). 
8. DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) collects information from 
offshore drillers under regulations that similarly hamper access to information. See  30 
C.F.R. § 550 (2014). Thus, although this paper focuses on BSEE, many of its 
recommendations are equally applicable to BOEM. 
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available through BSEE’s online Data Center. We therefore 
requested samples of such material through informal 
communications with BSEE and through formal Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. The latter resulted in 
referrals to nine different points of contact at BSEE and 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) over a six-
week period, at the end of which we were informed that the 
plans were not “releasable” under FOIA. Our subsequent FOIA 
request produced inconsistent responses from BSEE’s various 
regional officers and the total response time was more than 
four months. Our request for SEMS audit reports and 
Corrective Action Plans (“CAPs”) triggered a delay for BSEE to 
consult with the companies that submitted the reports. After 
more than three months, BSEE produced documents that were 
so heavily redacted as to be meaningless. These experiences 
demonstrate unwarranted and logistical roadblocks to the 
public’s access to information. 
Agencies are not guaranteed better access than the public. 
Despite BSEE’s mandate, the Regulations do not mandate 
information-sharing under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act (43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)) and the Regulations (§250.106(d)), to 
“cooperate” and “cooperate and consult” with relevant Federal 
agencies in enforcing safety and environmental laws and 
regulating lease operations. In fact, the Regulations contain 
only one instance of intergovernmental collaboration, involving 
cooperation between BSEE and the BOEM, another division 
within DOI. There is no explicit provision for the transfer of 
information from BSEE to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), United States Coast Guard (“USCG”), National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), or any 
other federal agency with jurisdiction over operational aspects 
of offshore drilling. BSEE purports to rely on memoranda of 
understanding and agreement (“MOUs/MOAs”) to meet its 
obligation to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration; 
however, existing interagency agreements often involve: (i) 
participation by only a subset of agencies involved in the 
oversight of offshore drilling; (ii) narrow topical coverage; (iii) a 
lack of clear benchmarks to assess the success of 
collaborations; and (iv) vague language. 
To address these deficiencies in information access, we 
recommend several mechanisms to (i) facilitate meaningful 
public access to safety and environmental information BSEE 
collects from offshore drillers and (ii) enhance intra- and inter-
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agency sharing of information about offshore drilling. These 
suggestions include steps that can be taken in the near-term, 
e.g., issuing guidance, and actions that require inter-agency 
coordination over a longer time frame, for example, developing 
a centralized reporting system that aggregates information 
about offshore drilling-related activities in a searchable and 
accessible format. In particular, BSEE should: 
 
• Issue guidance confirming that BSEE will apply a 
presumption of public access to, and need for, 
information relevant to safety and environmental 
impacts of offshore drilling. More particularly, such 
guidance should clarify that: (i) the presumption of 
public access applies to all lease and permit data and 
information that BSEE receives outside of a BSEE 
form, except as specifically provided otherwise in 
paragraph (b) of section 250.197; and (ii) the intent of 
paragraph (c) of section 250.197 is to expand public 
access to otherwise proprietary geophysical and 
geological data.9 
 
• Require reporting entities to provide a copy of 
submitted reports in a format immediately ready for 
public distribution (i.e., information claimed to be 
protected should be redacted). 
 
• Increase the scope of, and accessibility to, material 
posted on BSEE’s public website. 
 
• Revise its reporting forms to clarify the public’s right 
of immediate access to a greater portion of the 
information submitted to BSEE. 
 
• Create a centralized reporting system for offshore 
drilling-related activities to facilitate aggregation of 
information collected by all of the agencies with its 
9. Consistent with the executive directive to federal agencies to “adopt a 
presumption in favor of disclosure” and “take affirmative steps to make information 
public,” any default assumption of confidentiality needs to be shifted to a default 
assumption of public access. Memorandum from President Obama to Heads of Exec. 
Dept’s & Agencies, Re: Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 23, 2009), available at 
http://perma.cc/7CQ8-ZUPL. 
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jurisdiction in a single and searchable system 
available to the public and all interested regulators. 
Shared access to streamlined information within and 
among agencies would benefit not only agencies with 
specific authority over offshore drilling, but also 
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), whose responsibilities 
encompass consideration of the financial relevance of 
the safety and environmental impacts of offshore 
drilling. The SEC should be included in efforts to 
improve oversight of offshore drilling, particularly as 
it relates to information disclosure and access. 
 
These recommendations for improving access to information 
build on BSEE’s existing data collection processes and would 
not increase the amount or type of information that BSEE 
collects. Rather, the recommendations would streamline 
reporting and public access to information without creating 
additional substantive requirements for the regulated 
community and facilitate use of environmental performance 
indicators. 
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Table 1: Suggested Indicators 
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II.  THE NEED FOR PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND 
IMPROVED ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
In the years since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf 
of Mexico, policymakers have expressed interest in developing 
performance indicators for the offshore oil and gas industry.10 
However, much of their focus has been on the development of 
process safety indicators – indicators that correlate with the 
risk of catastrophic accidents.11 Far less consideration has been 
given to the development of indicators that correlate with harm 
to public health or the environment resulting from the routine 
construction, operation, and decommissioning of offshore wells 
(and ancillary equipment and operations). Yet, a true culture of 
safety cannot limit its attention to the prevention of 
catastrophic accidents; it must also seek to protect against the 
cumulative harms resulting from an operator’s day-to-day 
operations.12 
The development of environment-specific indicators is thus 
crucial. The Arctic region is “home to a number of unique, 
diverse, and fragile ecosystems.”13 These ecosystems sustain a 
diverse collection of species (including many marine mammals 
and endangered species), as well as human communities that 
depend on these ecosystems for their food and way of life.14 
These interests are threatened, not only by catastrophic 
accidents, but also by environmental impacts resulting from 
routine drilling activities, including, but not limited to, 
exploration, construction of wells and pipelines, transportation 
10. See INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PROD., REPORT NO. 456, PROCESS SAFETY: 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE ON KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (2011), available at 
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0jhs3Cvbynv; CHEM. SAFETY BD. PUB. HEARING, supra 
note 6, at 1; COMM. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY & ENVTL. MGMT. SYS. FOR 
OUTER CONT’L SHELF OIL & GAS OPERATIONS, TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., SPECIAL 
REPORT NO. 309, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFSHORE SAFETY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2012) [hereinafter TRANSP. RESEARCH 
BD.]. 
11. See INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PROD., supra note 10. 
12. See EMMETT ENVTL L. & POL’Y CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, COMMENTS ON 
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT (BSEE) DRAFT SAFETY 
CULTURE POLICY STATEMENT 3, Docket ID. BSEE-2012-0017 (2013) (“While it is 
critical to prevent accidents of all sorts, accident prevention is not synonymous with 
safety. A true “culture” of “safety” is broader and protects against intended as well as 
unintended danger and damage to persons, property and the environment.”). 
13. NATIONAL COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER, supra note 1, at 22. 
14. See id. at 13–15. 
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of oil and gas, and day-to-day operation of vessels, wells, and 
associated structures.15 To minimize damage to and adverse 
impacts on valuable human and environmental interests, 
environment-specific indicators must be developed and applied. 
The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling highlighted the importance of access 
to information about offshore drilling operations when it found 
that the disaster was preventable because it was the result, in 
large part, of a systemic breakdown of the environmental 
review process and a corporate culture that failed to promote 
safety or environmental performance.16 Improved oversight, 
including better collection of and public access to information, 
is particularly important with respect to any future offshore 
drilling in sensitive, complex, and controversial locations such 
as the Arctic.17 
Successful oversight includes not only the collection and 
processing of relevant information, but also meaningful and 
timely access to and review of such material by the public and 
relevant government agencies. Limited access to information 
hampers the ability of agencies and other stakeholders to 
perform effective and comprehensive reviews and analyses that 
could contribute to improved oversight of safety and 
environmental impacts from offshore drilling. Missed 
opportunities for information sharing will increase costs and 
inefficiencies for regulators and the regulated community 
alike. Our research found that private and public stakeholders 
15. See OIL IND. INT’L EXPLORATION & PROD. FORUM & UNEP, ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT IN OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 20 (1997) (listing 
environmental impacts associated with the day-to-day operation of an offshore well, 
including air, water, noise and light pollution). 
16. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 126–27, 224–25 (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L. 
COMM’N. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT]. 
17. While changes have occurred since the Deepwater Horizon disaster, such as the 
creation of BSEE and the SEMS program, a recent report from the United States 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board confirms that more can, and should, 
be done to improve the safety of offshore drilling, including via changes to the SEMS 
program. UNITED CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., Report No. 
2010-10-I-OS:, EXPLOSION AND FIRE AT THE MACONDO WELL: INVESTIGATION REPORT 
VOLUME 2 (2014), available at http://perma.cc/AYW2-7BEZ (“While US offshore 
regulations have undergone important changes since Macondo, more can be done to 
ensure a focus on preventing major accident events and to drive continuous safety 
improvement.”). 
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do not have sufficient or meaningful access to safety and 
environment-related information submitted by industry to the 
DOI (via BSEE and BOEM). Facilitating access to information 
is a critical step toward effective oversight of offshore drilling. 
 
III.  SELECTION OF INDICATORS 
The suggested performance indicators were chosen to track 
the environmental performance of offshore oil and gas 
companies operating in the U.S. Arctic. In identifying 
appropriate performance indicators, we sought to include a mix 
of leading, intermediate, and lagging indicators. Leading 
indicators measure the strength of a company’s safeguards 
against future failures in environmental performance. 
Intermediate indicators track relatively minor failures in an 
operator’s performance that may be predictive of more 
substantial performance failures. Lagging indicators track past 
failures in an operator’s environmental performance.18 We 
include several leading indicators because they help industry 
and interested persons to focus on the need for changes in an 
operator’s behavior before environmental harm occurs. Such a 
proactive approach is necessary where, as here, an operator’s 
failure to act in an environmentally responsible manner risks 
degrading a precious and irreplaceable ecosystem, such as 
exists in the Arctic. 
 We offer two general suggestions regarding the use of the 
performance indicators. First, we suggest that indicators 
should be measured in normalized units to allow for 
meaningful comparison of the performance of different 
operators, facilities or projects. Thus, units such as “barrels of 
oil spilled per million barrels of oil produced” or “workplace 
injuries per hours worked” should be used instead of units that 
do not take into account the size of an operation, such as 
“barrels of oil spilled” or “workplace injuries.” 
Second, we suggest that indicators should track both the 
trend of an indicator measure and its current value. It is 
necessary to consider indicator trends because there may be 
circumstances where the current value of an indicator may 
18. See OECD Guidance, supra note 5, at 5 (describing outcome and activities 
indicators). 
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correlate poorly with the prospective risk posed by an operator. 
For example, a single large hydrocarbon release is not 
necessarily predictive of poor future performance, especially if 
the operator responds to the event by implementing 
comprehensive changes to its safety and environmental 
compliance programs. At the same time, current value should 
be considered along with the trend, to reflect the fact that 
operators with consistently superior performance relative to 
the industry average have less opportunity to demonstrate 
improved performance. 
Below we define each selected indicator and explain its 
utility for evaluating an operator’s environmental performance. 
We then consider whether the Department of the Interior’s 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) or 
another federal agency currently has the raw data that is 
needed to establish the indicator, and if not, which agency has 
the authority to collect the data. Finally, we consider how 
interested members of the general public and the communities 
that are potentially affected by drilling activities will be able to 
access this data. 
A.  LEADING INDICATORS 
1.  Personal Surveys Regarding Operator’s Safety and 
Environmental Management System 
Definition 
The SEMS19 and SEMS II20 Rules (collectively referred to as 
the SEMS Rules) were adopted by BSEE in order to “focus 
attention on the role of human error and poor organization in 
accidents, drive continuous improvement in the offshore 
industry’s safety and environmental records, encourage the use 
of performance-based operating practices, and encourage 
collaboration between industry to promote the interests of 
offshore worker safety and environmental protection.”21 The 
19. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf —Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610 (Oct. 15, 2010) 
(codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) [hereinafter SEMS Rule]. 
20. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Revisions 
to Safety and Environmental Management Systems; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,423 
(Apr. 5, 2013) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) [hereinafter SEMS II Rule]. 
21. 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,424. 
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SEMS Rules require operators to develop and implement, inter 
alia, a facility-wide hazards analysis and a job safety 
analysis,22 a set of “written operating procedures . . . for 
conducting safe and environmentally sound activities,”23 and “a 
training program” to ensure that “all personnel are trained to 
work safely and are aware of environmental considerations 
offshore.”24 
The SEMS Rules require operators to audit their SEMS 
programs at least once every three years, and to submit the 
audit results to BSEE.25 We recommend that BSEE supplement 
these audits by conducting periodic surveys of an operator’s 
personnel (i.e., its employees and contracted workers). These 
surveys would ask personnel to answer questions related to the 
operator’s compliance with the SEMS Rules and about their 
own understanding of safety and environmental policies and 
procedures.26 
In developing such a survey program, BSEE could draw 
upon the experience of Australia’s National Offshore Petroleum 
Safety and Environmental Management Authority 
(NOPSEMA), which has recently started to administer a 
process safety survey to offshore workers at operations under 
its jurisdiction.27 NOPSEMA’s worker survey includes 
questions on eight topics: clarity of goals and responsibilities, 
supervisory involvement, worker professionalism/ 
empowerment, reporting, performance feedback, safety 
values/commitment, procedures and equipment, and training.28 
Offshore workers are asked whether they agree, tend to agree, 
tend to disagree, or disagree with a series of propositions, such 
as “[i]n my work group, process safety concerns are secondary 
to achieving production goals;” “I can report hazardous 
conditions without fear of negative consequences;” and “[m]y 
22. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.1911. (2014). 
23. Id. § 250.1913. 
24. Id. § 250.1915. 
25. See id. § 250.1920(b). 
26. Such interviews would also advance the recommendations of the Transportation 
Research Board. See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 10, at 5, 21. 
27. See Process Safety Surveys, NOPSEMA, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/ 
0p66iLGFng3. 
28. See NOPSEMA, OFFSHORE HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE REPORT 23 (2010) 
[hereinafter OFFSHORE HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE REPORT], available at 
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0EYDfs6e52X. 
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supervisor/immediate manager puts a high priority on process 
safety through actions and not just empty slogans.”29 Once 
collected, an operator’s scores are compared to benchmarks 
provided by a professional services company to determine 
whether the operator’s performance is satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory.30 
At present, NOPSEMA reports the results of its surveys in 
aggregate,31 which prevents interested persons from using this 
data to compare the performance of different operators. We 
recommend rating each operator individually, so that 
interested persons (i.e., investors, regulators, and the public 
generally) can encourage underperforming companies to make 
improvements. 
Why are such surveys useful indicators? 
Survey answers concerning an operator’s compliance with 
the SEMS Rules would provide important information 
regarding the operator’s safety culture and, hence, its 
prospective risk. The importance of an effective safety culture 
in preventing catastrophic accidents cannot be overstated; 
indeed, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (“National 
Commission”) concluded that the inadequacy of the relevant 
companies’ safety cultures was “the clear root cause of the 
blowout” on the Deepwater Horizon.32 But a far more common 
manifestation of an inadequate safety culture will be less 
dramatic, less visible (but nonetheless unacceptable) harm to 
people and the environment resulting from daily, routine 
operations. Because personnel surveys will offer insight into 
both catastrophic and non-catastrophic risk, they are especially 
useful for highlighting environmentally responsible 
performance and risk-minimizing behaviors (and the absence 
thereof). 
29. Offshore Process Safety Culture Survey, NOPSEMA, http://perma. 
law.harvard.edu/0YTCfRqJG3s. 
30. See OFFSHORE HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 23. 
31. See id. 
32. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING 133 (2011); see also id. at 217 (calling on industry to embark on “sweeping 
reforms that accomplish no less than a fundamental transformation of its safety 
culture”). 
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In addition to providing information to regulators, investors, 
and other interested persons, regular personnel surveys would 
have two additional benefits: they would incentivize operators 
to improve their SEMS programs and raise personnel 
awareness of the SEMS program. 
How will the necessary information be obtained? 
Surveys could be conducted on paper or online and could be 
administered by BSEE or a reliable third party. BSEE has 
ample legal authority to establish such a program (though it 
would need to comply with the procedures set forth in the 
Paperwork Reduction Act before doing so).33 Existing 
regulations permit BSEE to evaluate a facility to determine 
whether an operator’s SEMS program “is in place, addresses all 
required elements, and is effective in protecting the safety and 
health of workers, the environment, and preventing 
incidents.”34 BSEE has authority to verify that personnel are 
following the SEMS program as part of this evaluation.35 
Therefore, BSEE has authority to conduct a personnel survey 
to verify that an operator’s SEMS program addresses all 
required elements and that personnel are complying with the 
SEMS program. 
Upon collecting survey data and determining whether an 
operator’s performance on each program component is 
satisfactory, BSEE can and should publish the results36 so that 
other agencies and interested members of the public can make 
use of this indicator. 
33. See 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a) (2006) (providing that an agency must comply with 
certain procedures before conducting a “collection of information”); id. § 3502(3) 
(defining “collection of information” as, inter alia, “the obtaining . . . of facts or opinions 
by or for an agency, regardless of form or format” calling for “answers to identical 
questions posed to . . . ten or more persons”); see also Memorandum from Cass R. 
Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dept’s & 
Agencies, & Indep. Regulatory Agencies (April 7, 2010), available at 
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/077yjb6wyq1 (“The requirements of the [Paperwork 
Reduction Act] apply to voluntary collections as well as to mandatory 
collections . . . .”). 
34. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1924(a). 
35. See id. at § 250.1924(c)(1). 
36. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE 686 (2004) 
(noting that agencies are generally free to make “discretionary disclosures”), available 
at http://perma.cc/7TA6-5GK6. 
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2. Safety and Pollution Prevention Equipment Maintenance 
Backlog 
Definition 
Safety and pollution prevention equipment (SPPE) are 
components of an installation the failure of which could cause 
or contribute substantially to a major accident or pollution 
incident.37 The purpose of SPPE is to prevent or limit the effect 
of a major accident or pollution incident. SPPE maintenance is 
the inspection, testing, and other maintenance needed to 
ensure that SPPE “remain[s] in good working order and 
continue[s] to meet defined performance standards.”38 SPPE 
maintenance backlog is a performance indicator that measures 
the percentage of SPPE inspections, tests, and other 
maintenance operations that are not completed on time. 
We wish to emphasize that SPPE must be understood to 
include computer control systems and similar software. 
Automated systems are essential for the safety, reliability, and 
performance of modern offshore drilling vessels,39 and the 
failure of these systems are among the most common causes of 
reported incidents on these vessels.40 Given the importance of 
computer systems to process safety, it is critical that computer 
inspection and maintenance be included in an indicator 
tracking SPPE maintenance backlog.41 
37. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1916 (requiring operators to establish a mechanical integrity 
program to ensure the integrity of “all equipment and systems used to prevent or 
mitigate uncontrolled releases of hydrocarbons, toxic substances, or other materials 
that may cause environmental or safety consequences”). Cf. OIL & GAS UK, HEALTH & 
SAFETY REPORT 5 (2012), available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0Wo8JceiDpQ. 
(defining “safety-critical elements” and noting that their failure to meet performance 
standards can present an “immediate risk” to personnel). 
38. Bob Lauder, Major Hazard (Asset Integrity) Key Performance Indicators in use in 
the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, CHEM. SAFETY BD. PUB. HEARING, supra note 6. 
39. See Jon Espen Skogdalen & Oyvind Smogeli, Reliability of Safety Critical 
Control Systems on Offshore Drilling Vessels 1 (Univ. Cal. Berkeley, Deepwater 
Horizon Study Grp., Working Paper, 2011). 
40. See id. at 7 (noting that computer issues were responsible for the majority of 
incidents reported to the International Marine Contractors Association in 2007). 
41. Computer programs fit comfortably within the definition of “equipment and 
systems” that must be included in an operator’s “mechanical integrity program.” See 
30 C.F.R. § 250.1916. 
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Why is this a useful indicator? 
An operator’s SPPE maintenance backlog is a useful 
indicator because it provides information about how 
consistently the operator maintains critical equipment and 
systems in the face of competing concerns. This indicator offers 
strong predictive value because equipment failure and ensuing 
environmental harm are more likely to occur when SPPE have 
not been regularly tested and maintained according to 
established procedures. Once the basic parameters of a SPPE 
maintenance indicator are established, the indicator could be 
further improved by assigning different weight to different 
equipment, such that timely inspections of comparatively more 
fragile, more essential equipment could be given greater weight 
than timely inspections of comparatively less fragile, less 
essential equipment. 
How will the necessary information be obtained? 
BSEE does not currently collect an operator’s SPPE 
maintenance backlog, but it has ample authority to do so. 
Under the SEMS Rule, operators are required to document 
“each inspection and test that has been performed on” [all 
equipment and systems used to prevent or mitigate 
uncontrolled releases of hydrocarbons, toxic substances, or 
other materials that may cause environmental or safety 
consequence]” (i.e., SPPE).42 The SEMS Rule also requires 
operators to make available to BSEE all “documents or other 
information” pertaining to their SEMS programs upon BSEE’s 
request.43 Thus, BSEE has authority to obtain any documents 
or information related to an operator’s SPPE maintenance 
simply by requesting it. To reduce administrative costs, BSEE 
could issue a notice to lessees (NTL) specifying the manner, 
42. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1916(d) (requires operators to document “each inspection and 
test that has been performed on [all equipment and systems used to prevent or 
mitigate uncontrolled releases of hydrocarbons, toxic substances, or other materials 
that may cause environmental or safety consequence]”). 
43. Id. § 250.1924(b)(5); see also Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer 
Continental Shelf—Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer 
Continental Shelf, 80 Fed. Reg. 9939, 9968 (Feb. 24, 2015) (including in the proposed 
operational standards for drilling in the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea Planning 
Areas a requirement to “maintain records pertaining to testing, inspection, and 
maintenance of [Source Control and Containment Equipment] for at least 10 years and 
make the records available to any authorized BSEE representative upon request.”). 
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timeframe, and format for submissions of requested 
information.44 Operators who are compliant with the SEMS 
Rules should already have records of planned, deferred, and 
delayed maintenance work;45 therefore, organizing this data for 
submission to BSEE should not be burdensome. 
Upon compiling this information, BSEE should publish the 
results. If BSEE declines to do so, interested persons should be 
able to obtain the information by filing a FOIA request.46 FOIA 
requests are not the preferred option. 
3. Air Pollution 
Definition 
This indicator would track emissions of certain air pollutants 
from an operator’s offshore facilities. Offshore drilling facilities 
and support vessels emit nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide 
(SO2), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), particulate matter 
(e.g., black carbon) and greenhouse gases (GHGs) as the result 
of flaring and venting of gases, combustion processes, mud 
degreasing, and other activities.47 These pollutants harm the 
environment locally (in the case of NOX, SO2, VOCs and 
particulate matter) and globally (in the case of GHGs). NOX 
and SO2 contribute to acid precipitation, which harms “lakes, 
streams, and forests and the plants and animals that live in 
these ecosystems.”48 VOCs and NOX contribute to the 
formation of ground-level ozone, which adversely “affects 
sensitive vegetation and ecosystems” and can cause “loss of 
species diversity and changes to habitat quality and water and 
nutrient cycles.”49 GHGs contribute to climate change, which is 
44. 30 C.F.R. § 250.103 (“BSEE may issue Notices to Lessees and Operators (NTLs) 
that clarify, supplement, or provide more detail about certain requirements. NTLs 
may also outline what you must provide as required information in your various 
submissions to BSEE.”). 
45. See id. § 250.1916(c) (requiring operators to maintain written procedures to 
address the “frequency of inspections and tests”); id. at § 250.1916(d). 
46. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
47. See OIL IND. INT’L EXPLORATION & PROD. FORUM & UNEP, supra note 15, at 12; 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, YEAR 2008 
GULFWIDE EMISSION INVENTORY STUDY 1–2 (2010). 
 
48. Acid Rain, ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, http://perma.law.harvard. 
edu/08LcuzGztbc. 
49.  Ground Level Ozone: Ecosystem Effects, ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, 
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causing fluctuations in the global water cycle, melting of Arctic 
sea ice, ocean warming and sea level rise, ocean acidification, 
and other significant environmental changes, as well as 
adversely affecting human communities and ecosystems 
worldwide.50 Black carbon absorbs solar energy and as it 
settles on ice and snow causes melting, thus exacerbating 
environmental change and damage, particularly in the Arctic.51 
Emissions of these pollutants from offshore drilling facilities 
and support vessels should be measured and regularly 
reported. This information would allow regulators to take 
appropriate action to protect the Arctic environment and could 
be used by investors and other interested persons to advocate 
for changes in operator behavior. Emissions should be reported 
in normalized units, such as “kg SO2 per million barrels of oil 
produced.” 
Why is this a useful indicator? 
Although offshore drilling will inevitably produce some air 
pollution, it is possible for operators to significantly reduce 
their emissions through the use of emerging technologies and 
best management practices, including more efficient gas 
turbines, improved flare design, and improved well testing 
procedures and technologies.52 Operators with a strong 
commitment to environmentally responsible performance and 
effective internal governance mechanisms should be adopting 
technologies and practices that minimize their emissions. By 
contrast, operators that lack a strong commitment to 
environmentally responsible performance or effective internal 
governance mechanisms are unlikely to adopt emission control 
technologies and practices voluntarily. Thus, emissions data 
can be helpful for ascertaining which operators place the 
greatest priority on environmentally responsible performance. 
http://perma.law.harvard. edu/0maBY9Dehoc. 
50. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1 (2013). 
51. Effects of Black Carbon, ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa. 
gov/blackcarbon (last visited April 27, 2015). 
52. OIL IND. INT’L EXPLORATION & PROD. FORUM & UNEP, supra note 15, at 13, 55. 
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How will the necessary information be obtained? 
Since 2005, BOEM, or its predecessor, has performed a 
Gulfwide Emissions Inventory every three years.53 To create 
this inventory, BOEM requires operators to “report activity 
information including facility, equipment, and fuel usage” over 
the course of a year.54 Using this data and standardized 
emissions factors provided by EPA, BOEM estimates the 
facility’s emissions of NOx, SO2, VOCs, and GHGs (among 
other pollutants).55 BOEM has published the activity 
information it used to estimate the emissions of each offshore 
drilling rig.56 That information could be used to estimate and 
compare the emissions and emissions intensity of each 
operator’s operations. 
In addition, BOEM has authority to collect monthly 
emissions data for Alaska and operations in the U.S. Arctic; 
indeed, BOEM already requires lessees (i.e., operators) to 
monitor their emissions.57 BOEM should do so, and the 
information should be made public. 
 
B. INTERMEDIATE INDICATORS 
1. Civil and Administrative Violations 
Definition 
This indicator tracks the number of successful civil and 
administrative enforcement actions taken and incidents of 
noncompliance issued against an operator in response to its 
safety and environmental violations. At a minimum, this 
indicator should include actions taken by BSEE and BOEM in 
response to violations of 30 C.F.R. Parts 250 and 550, and 
53. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., NTL No. 2014-G01, GULFWIDE OCS 
EMISSIONS INVENTORY: WESTERN GULF OF MEXICO (2013). 
54. See id. 
55. See id. 
56. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, YEAR 
2008 GULFWIDE EMISSION INVENTORY STUDY F-6 (2010). 
57. See 30 C.F.R. § 550.303(k) (“The lessee shall monitor, in a manner approved or 
prescribed by the Regional Supervisor, emissions from the facility” and “shall submit 
this information monthly in a manner and form approved or prescribed by the 
Regional Supervisor.”). 
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actions taken by EPA in response to violations of the Clean Air 
Act and the Clean Water Act and their implementing 
regulations. The indicator could thereafter be expanded to 
include enforcement actions taken by other agencies, such as 
the Department of Transportation or the USCG. Violations 
should be categorized based on their severity (which will 
typically correlate with penalty size or extensiveness of 
injunctive relief). This indicator should be normalized to allow 
for meaningful comparison of the performance of different 
operators (e.g., in units of “major violations per million barrels 
of oil”). 
Why is this a useful indicator? 
If an operator regularly incurs penalties for violating safety 
and environmental laws, it is likely that the operator has 
systemic problems with its compliance programs and safety 
culture. Conversely, if an operator has a relatively spotless 
record, it is likely that the operator has strong compliance 
programs and a strong safety culture. Therefore, an operator’s 
compliance record is a predictor of its future safety and 
environmental performance. However, it must be remembered 
that offshore drilling is inherently risky; hence, even operators 
with a relatively spotless compliance record must remain 
vigilant to risk at all times.58 
How will the necessary information be obtained? 
BSEE has published a list of all incidents of noncompliance 
issued to offshore operators since 200059 and all civil penalties 
assessed against offshore operators since 1998.60 This data 
could be organized by operator, categorizing violations based on 
their severity, and normalized to account for differences in each 
operator’s output. 
By contrast, EPA has not routinely made information about 
its past enforcement actions against offshore operators publicly 
58. JAMES A. BAKER ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE BP U.S. REFINERIES INDEPENDENT 
SAFETY REVIEW PANEL, at i (2007). 
59. Incidents of Noncompliance, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT, 
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0dn1hqNynMP. 
60. Civil Penalties and Appeals, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT, 
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0iSR5TXq9Ay. 
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accessible. EPA should establish a database similar to BSEE’s 
database to facilitate access by BSEE, other agencies, 
investors, and other members of the public.61 Until EPA creates 
such a database, the information is available through FOIA.62 
2. Kick Frequency and Kick Response Time 
Definition 
This indicator would measure an operator’s ability to prevent 
and manage well kicks (also referred to as “well control 
incidents”). A kick occurs when the weight of “drilling mud” 
(the liquid used to counterbalance upward pressure exerted by 
the hydrocarbon formation) is insufficient to maintain 
equilibrium within the formation, causing fluids to flow 
upwards through the well and drill pipe.63 A kick can cause a 
blowout unless personnel promptly take the appropriate 
response action (i.e., closing the well’s blowout-preventer 
valves).64 
Following safety expert Professor Andrew Hopkins of 
Australian National University in Canberra,65 we suggest two 
indicators related to well kicks: the number of kicks per well 
per year (kick frequency)66 and the average time it takes 
personnel to notice and respond to a well kick (kick response 
time). 
Why are these useful indicators? 
Kick frequency is a useful indicator because it is directly 
correlated with blowout risk (since a kick “is an immediate 
precursor to a blowout”67). Moreover, because this indicator will 
61. See, e.g., Inspections and Enforcement: Incident Statistics and Summaries, 
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT, http://perma.law.harvard. 
edu/09YDEEf31kR. 
62. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
63. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 91. 
64. See id.; Andrew Hopkins, Safety Indicators for Offshore Drilling 6 and 8 
(Chemical Safety Board, Working Paper, 2012) (noting that a kick is “the immediate 
precursor to a blowout.”). 
65. See Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6, 8. 
66. If data are available, it may be preferable to measure frequency in terms of kicks 
per well completion. 
67. Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6. 
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track a single aspect of operator performance (pressure 
management),68 it should be easy for operators to modify their 
behavior in response to unacceptable performance (e.g., by 
providing additional training to relevant personnel or providing 
additional resources). If an operator consistently reports high 
kick frequency relative to others in the industry (even after 
adjustments are made for the fact that some wells are 
inherently more likely to kick69), this may indicate that the 
operator undervalues safety relative to the industry. 
Like kick frequency, kick response time is directly correlated 
with blowout risk. This is because gaseous hydrocarbons 
expand with ever-increasing speed as they travel up the 
wellbore,70 causing the strength of the kick to increase with 
time. Like kick frequency, kick response time tracks a single 
aspect of operator performance (in this case, kick 
management). Thus, an operator must modify its behavior to 
address unacceptable performance, and its repeated failure to 
do so is likely indicative of a corporate culture that 
undervalues safety. 
Kick frequency and kick response time have one additional 
advantage as indicators: they measure unambiguous events 
that are recorded in real time by the operator’s computer 
systems.71 For this reason, they are less open to interpretation 
or manipulation than other indicators.72 
How will the necessary information be obtained? 
BSEE already requires operators to report well kicks as part 
of their weekly (daily, in Alaska) Well Activity Report,73 and 
reports all well control incidents on its website, along with the 
identity of the responsible operator.74 This data provides a 
68. See generally NAT’L COMM’N REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 91 
(noting that kick frequency is largely a function of the crew’s ability to monitor and 
adjust the density of the drilling mud to maintain equilibrium). 
69. These adjustments could be made by using the Dodson Mechanical Risk Index, 
which assigns wells to one of five categories based on its “complexity” (i.e., its 
propensity to kick). See Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6–7. 
70. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 109. 
71. See Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6, 8. 
72. Id. 
73. Form BSEE-0133, available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0BBrSPBpYzD. 
74. See Loss of Well Control: Statistics and Summaries, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND 
ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0YD335ZSsgg. 
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usable indicator when organized by operator and well type.75 
Thus, indicators could be reported in units such as “kicks at 
high complexity wells per year.” BSEE has ample authority to 
require the reporting of kick response time.76 It could issue an 
NTL requiring operators to include this information in their 
Well Activity Reports.77 
C. LAGGING INDICATORS 
1. Loss of Primary Containment Events 
Definition 
This indicator tracks the number of loss of primary 
containment (LOPC) events occurring at an operator’s wells, 
building upon the work of the American Petroleum Institute 
and the American National Standards Institute (API/ANSI). 
API/ANSI define LOPC as “[a]n unplanned or uncontrolled 
release of any material . . . including non-toxic and non-
flammable materials” from the primary vessel or equipment 
intended to hold it.78 API/ANSI has established two tiers of 
LOPC. Tier 1 events involve fatalities, hospital admissions, 
injuries causing “days away from work,” community 
evacuations, fires or explosions resulting in at least $25,000 in 
direct cost to the company, or discharges exceeding a specified 
75. See Hopkins, supra note 64, at 6–7 (discussing the Dodson Mechanical Risk 
Index, which assigns wells to one of five categories based on its propensity to kick). 
76. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.469 (providing that an operator may be required to submit 
any record maintained pursuant to section 250.466); 30 C.F.R. § 250.466(g) (requiring 
operators to maintain, inter alia, information “required by the District Manager in the 
interests of resource evaluation, waste prevention, conservation of natural resources, 
and the protection of correlative rights, safety, and environment”). 
77. Interested members of the public could request BSEE to issue such an NTL. See 
5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012) (“[A]n interested person may appear before an agency . . .  for 
the presentation . . . of an issue, request, or controversy . . .  in connection with an 
agency function.”).  If BSEE did not grant such a request, interested persons could file 
a petition for rulemaking with the agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (“Each agency 
shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule.”); 43 C.F.R. Part 14 (DOI regulations implementing section 553(e)). 
Interested persons should encourage BSEE to make this information public if it begins 
collecting it. 
78. See AM. PETROLEUM INST. & AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., PROCESS SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE REFINING AND PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES: 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE § 3.1.17, at 754 (1st ed. 2010); see also id. § 3.1.4 (defining 
“containment, primary”). 
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mass threshold over a one hour period.79 Tier 2 events are non–
Tier 1 events that involve a reportable injury to any worker, 
fires or explosions resulting in at least $2,500 of direct cost to 
the company, or discharges exceeding a less stringent mass 
threshold over a one-hour period.80 (Tier 2 events are treated 
as an intermediate indicator on our Table 1). 
Related indicators could be established to track the mass of 
material released from primary containment. All indicators 
should be reported in normalized units (e.g., “Tier 1 events per 
million barrels of oil produced;” “mass of material released per 
million barrels of oil produced”). 
Why is this a useful indicator? 
Tier 1 events are classified as lagging indicators because 
they cause significant harm to people or the environment in the 
form of fatalities, injuries, explosions, fires, or releases of 
chemicals and pollutants. For this reason, the number of Tier 1 
events that occur on an offshore rig can serve as an important 
lagging indicator of the operator’s safety and environmental 
performance. Repeated Tier 1 events indicate that an operator’s 
process safety and environmental compliance programs are 
ineffective, and that the operator is ill-equipped to prevent 
future process safety or environmental incidents. By contrast, a 
relatively spotless history should inspire confidence that an 
operator has strong process safety and environmental 
compliance programs. However, it must be remembered that 
“[t]he passing of time without a process accident is not 
necessarily an indication that all is well;”81 hence, operators 
and regulators must remain vigilant to risk at all times. 
Tier 2 events can be considered lagging or intermediate 
indicators.82 These events are typically associated with some 
harm to people or the environment, and although this harm is 
not as significant as that associated with a Tier 1 event, it is an 
important indicator in its own right. Moreover, because Tier 1 
79. See id. § 5.2; see also id. at 10 Table 1 (listing mass thresholds for Tier 1 events). 
80. See id. § 6.2; see also id. at 12 Table 2 (listing mass thresholds for Tier 2 events). 
81. BAKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 3. 
82. See INT’L ASS’N OIL & GAS PROD., supra note 10, at 3 (“[M]ost LOPC events will 
have no actual consequences but are still failures and therefore lagging outcomes, but 
low consequence LOPC events also provide leading information when predicting the 
likelihood of major incidents with serious consequences.”). 
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and Tier 2 events typically have a common etiology, the 
number of Tier 2 events that have occurred at an operator’s 
facilities can be expected to correlate with the likelihood that 
the operator will experience a Tier 1 event in the future. 
Hence, Tier 2 events serve an important predictive function as 
well. 
How will the necessary information be obtained? 
Operators are already required to report certain LOPC to 
BSEE, including all reportable releases of H2S, all gas releases 
that initiate equipment or process shutdown, and all LOPC 
that cause fatalities, injuries, fires, or explosions, or that 
require personnel to muster for evacuation or that cause 
property or equipment damage greater than $25,000.83 BSEE 
includes information about these events on its website.84 This 
information can be organized by operator and normalized to 
account for differences in each operator’s output. To determine 
whether an event listed on these databases involved LOPC, 
reference should be made to the “incident description” provided 
for the event to confirm that the incident involved “[a]n 
unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material” and not, for 
example, a fire caused by an engine malfunction. 
BSEE’s existing reporting requirements cover many, but not 
all, Tier 1 events and some Tier 2 events (e.g., operators are not 
currently required to report LOPC events involving super-
threshold releases of hazardous substances unless the release 
caused another reportable event85). BSEE has authority to 
require operators to include information about otherwise non-
reportable LOPC in their Well Activity Reports.86 BSEE could 
83. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.188. (2014). 
84. See Inspections and Enforcement: Incident Statistics and Summaries, BUREAU OF 
SAFETY AND ENVT’L ENFORCEMENT, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/09YDEEf31kR. 
85. These releases would probably also be exempted from the reporting 
requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050. (2012). Although EPCRA generally requires 
facility owners to report releases of “extremely hazardous substance[s],” there is an 
exception for releases that result in exposure to persons solely within the site where 
the facility is located. 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(1), (4). 
86. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.469 (providing that an operator may be required to submit 
any record maintained pursuant to section 250.466); id. § 250.466(g) (requiring 
operators to maintain, inter alia, information “required by the District Manager in the 
interests of resource evaluation, waste prevention, conservation of natural resources, 
and the protection of correlative rights, safety, and environment”). 
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issue an NTL on its own initiative or in response to a request. 
Similarly, interested persons could encourage BSEE to issue an 
NTL requiring operators to report the mass of material 
released from primary containment and include LOPC data in 
Well Activity Reports. 
2. Oil Releases 
Definition 
This indicator would track the number of oil releases that 
occur at an operator’s offshore facilities or during product 
transport (i.e., from oil pipelines or tankers). Following the 
system adopted by the U.K. Health and Safety Executive, 
releases could be classified as major, significant, or minor, 
depending upon the mass of oil released and the potential of 
the release to cause a major accident upon ignition.87 
Why is this a useful indicator? 
Oil releases can cause major environmental impacts and 
threaten public and personnel safety; hence, an operator that is 
unable to prevent oil releases will be at a higher risk of both 
forms of harm. Large-scale releases can cause severe habitat 
destruction and widespread plant and animal mortality,88 and 
even small releases can cause unacceptable environmental 
harm (e.g., marine mammal mortality as the result of oil 
inhalation or ingestion).89 Thus, responsible operators minimize 
if not eliminate the number of oil releases that occur at their 
facilities. 
How will the necessary information be obtained? 
Releases within BSEE’s Jurisdiction. Operators are already 
required to report to BSEE all oil releases at their offshore 
facilities.90 Pursuant to BSEE regulations and a Memorandum 
87. See Hydrocarbon Releases System: Internet Help File, HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC., 
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0Uh8KNh6jMZ (listing mass and mass flow rate 
thresholds for “major” and “significant” releases). 
88. See generally Guidelines on Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution INT’L PETROLEUM 
INDUS. ENVTL. CONSERVATION ASS’N (IPIECA)], (Jan. 1991). 
89. See NOAA MARINE FISHERIES SERV., IMPACTS OF OIL ON MARINE MAMMALS AND 
SEA TURTLES, available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0uiAJ7jC6e5. 
90. See 30 C.F.R. § 254.46 (2011) (BSEE’s reporting requirements for oil spills). 
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of Understanding between the Department of the Interior 
(DOI) and the Department of Transportation (DOT), pipeline 
facilities that are under the control of a “producing operator” 
are covered by this rule.91 Operators are required to report 
spills of one barrel or more immediately,92 and to submit a 
written follow up report within fifteen days of the end of the 
spill. The follow up report must include the cause of the 
release, its location and volume, and the response action 
taken.93 Releases of less than one barrel must be reported to 
BSEE as part of the Performance Measures Data included in 
Form BSEE-0131.94 
BSEE publishes annual data for oil spills of fifty barrels or 
more and identifies the operator responsible for each spill.95 
BSEE does not distinguish between releases from pipelines 
and releases from other offshore facilities; data for both types 
of releases can be found in the same report. This data could be 
organized by operator and normalized by reference to the 
number of releases per million barrels of oil produced in order 
to account for differences in each operator’s output. 
BSEE also publishes annual data for spills of one barrel or 
greater, but does not identify the responsible operator.96 
Without the identity of the responsible operator, the data on 
smaller spills is not useful for comparing operators’ 
performance. BSEE can and should identify the operators 
responsible for each recorded spill in future reports. 
Releases within PHMSA’s Jurisdiction. Pursuant to a 
Memorandum of Understanding between DOI and DOT, 
91. See 30 C.F.R. § 254.6 (defining “facility” to include pipelines not covered by the 
Deepwater Port Act of 1974); Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Department of Transportation and the Department of the Interior Regarding Outer 
Continental Shelf Pipelines 2 (Dec. 10, 1996) (“DOT will [have jurisdiction over] all 
OCS transportation pipelines beginning downstream of the point at which operating 
responsibility transfers from a producing operator to a transporting operator.”). 
92. See 30 C.F.R. § 254.46(b). 
93. See id. at § 254.46(b)(2). 
94. See id. at § 254.46(b)(2). 
95. See BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, SUMMARY OCS 
SPILLS OF 50 BARRELS (2,100 GALLONS) AND GREATER, CALENDAR YEAR 1964–2012, 
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0tDEzCH8gsJ. 
96. See BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, All Petroleum 
Spills > 1 Barrel from OCS Oil & Gas Activities by Size Category and Year, 1964 to 
2013, http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/Enforcement/Accidents_and_ 
Incidents/All%20Spills%201964-2011.pdf (last visited April 27, 2015). 
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pipeline facilities that are under the control of a “transporting 
operator” are under the jurisdiction of DOT’s Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).97 
PHMSA requires pipeline owners to report all spills of five 
barrels or more.98 PHMSA publishes these incidents on its 
website,99 and provides a page for each operator that lists the 
offshore incidents for which the operator is responsible.100 
Hence, interested persons already have access to most of the 
information necessary to track offshore spills that occur within 
PHMSA’s jurisdiction; additional data (e.g., release mass) could 
be obtained by filing a FOIA request. 
Releases from Tankers. It is expected that oil produced 
offshore in the Arctic will be transported to shore by 
pipeline.101 However, in the event that operators begin 
transporting oil by tanker, releases from these vessels should 
also be tracked. Existing regulations require responsible 
persons to notify the Coast Guard immediately in the event of 
an oil release from a vessel.102 The Coast Guard makes 
available on the National Response Center website annual data 
regarding incidents to which it responds.103 Interested persons 
should refer to this data in the event that operators begin 
97. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Transportation 
and the Department of the Interior Regarding Outer Continental Shelf Pipelines, 
supra note 91, at 2-3. 
98. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.50(b) (2012). 
99. See Significant Pipeline Incidents: Hazardous Liquids (Offshore), PIPELINE AND 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/ 
analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages (last visited April 27, 2015) (To determine the 
identity of the responsible operator, click on the number of incidents that occurred 
during a given year. This brings up a page with a table listing incidents by their cause. 
Clicking on the incident number total brings up a third page that identifies the 
operator responsible for each release and the amount of property damage that 
resulted.). 
100. See e.g., Operator Information PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 
ADMINISTRATION, (Mar. 6, 2015, 9:17 PM), http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/ 
operator/OperatorReport_opid_31759 .html. 
101. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL 
AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2012–2017: FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT 2–7 (2012) (“Oil from the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea Planning 
Areas would be transported by new subsea and overland pipelines to the TAPS [Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System] and delivered to the marine terminal facilities in Valdez, 
where it would be loaded on tankers and shipped primarily to West Coast ports.”). 
102. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.120(a)(1) (2010). 
103. See NAT’L RESPONSE CTR., DOWNLOAD NRC DATA,  
http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/Default.aspx. 
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using tankers to transport oil from offshore facilities in the 
Arctic. 
3. Work-Related Fatalities and Reportable Injuries 
Definition 
This indicator tracks the number of work-related fatalities 
and reportable injuries that occur at an operator’s offshore 
facilities. Tracking BSEE’s regulations, we use the term 
reportable injury to refer to injuries that either require the 
evacuation of the injured person from the offshore facility or 
result in one or more days away from work or one or more days 
of restricted work or job transfer.104 
Why are these useful indicators? 
A work-related fatality or reportable injury is the ultimate 
failure of an operator’s safety compliance program. An operator 
that consistently fails to protect its workers from on-the-job 
harm is unlikely to be effectively addressing other safety and 
environmental concerns. Such an operator should not be 
permitted to operate in a sensitive area such as the Arctic until 
it is able to show that it has made significant improvements to 
its compliance programs. 
How will the necessary information be obtained? 
BSEE already requires operators to report all fatalities and 
reportable injuries that occur at their offshore facilities.105 
BSEE publishes annual fatality and reportable injury data on 
its website, along with identification of the responsible 
operator.106 
 
104. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.188(a)(2), (b)(1) (2012). 
105. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.188(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1). 
106. BSEE, FATALITIES – STATISTICS AND SUMMARIES 2007–2014, http:// 
www.bsee.gov/Inspection-and-Enforcement/Accidents-and-Incidents/Fatalities/; BSEE, 
INJURIES – STATISTICS AND SUMMARIES 2007–2014, http://www.bsee.gov/Inspection-
and-Enforcement/Accidents-and-Incidents/Injuries/ (last visited April 27, 2015). 
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IV. SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Performance indicators are crucial to the ability of 
regulators, affected communities, and the public to determine 
which drilling companies should be entrusted with access to 
the nation’s most sensitive and pristine resource areas, 
including the Arctic. Regulators and the public need 
meaningful access to information in order to assess a 
company’s environmental performance and effectively exercise 
oversight of drilling activities. Accordingly, we now turn to 
ways to improve information access. 
 
 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1331 et 
seq.) and the Regulations establish a regime under which 
industry transfers to BSEE significant amounts of information, 
including material relevant to evaluating safety and 
environmental impacts of offshore drilling activities. These 
information submission requirements apply across the life of a 
project. For instance, operators must submit certain reports for 
approval by BSEE before altering drilling procedures, thereby 
providing BSEE with information to assess environmental 
risks while the underlying operations are still in the planning 
stages.107 Operators are also required to provide or make 
available to BSEE periodic updates as well as event-triggered 
reports, thus giving BSEE information for continually 
monitoring compliance through the life of a project.108 In 
addition, BSEE may inspect drill sites, with or without prior 
notice to the operator.109 
107. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.286-295 (2012) (regarding Deepwater Operations 
Plans and Conceptual Plans), 250.410-18 (regarding permits to drill wells). BOEM also 
collects information from operators prior to the commencement of exploration and/or 
development and production activities. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 550.201 (regarding timing 
for submitting Exploration Plans, Development and Production Plans, Development 
Operations Coordination Documents and Conservation Information Documents). 
108. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.187-190 (regarding incident reporting), 250.192 
(regarding reporting relating to hurricanes and other natural occurrences), 250.516 
(regarding blowout prevention system testing). 
109. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.130-132, 301 (regarding inspections). 
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The breadth of information available to and collected by 
BSEE ranges from general plans to the technical minutia of 
individual site operations, including, but not limited to: H2S 
contingency plans; Blowout Protection procedures; Deepwater 
Operations Plans; SEMS plans, audited reports and records; 
equipment design and performance specifications; maintenance 
test results; maps and schematic drawings of proposed drill 
sites; geological and geophysical data; and incident reports 
related to events such as workplace injuries and evacuations. 
Despite the scope of information available to BSEE, public 
access to the information is limited. 
A. UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTED PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO EVALUATLING 
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 
A 2009 Presidential Memorandum directs federal agencies to 
“take affirmative steps to make information public” and adopt 
“a presumption of disclosure” in processing requests for 
information under FOIA.110 In this vein, BSEE’s objectives, 
articulated in an agency manual, include “mak[ing] 
information available to the public even before a request is 
made” and “[a]dminister[ing] the FOIA with a clear 
presumption in favor of disclosure.”111 However, these goals are 
not reflected in BSEE’s Regulations or in its actions, 
particularly as they relate to information relevant to safety and 
environmental concerns. In particular, the Regulations 
themselves lack a clear statement adopting a presumption in 
favor of disclosure and contain confusing language regarding 
the public availability of information used by BSEE to “promote 
operational safety” or “protect the environment.”112 In addition, 
as discussed below, the agency makes subjective decisions as to 
when and to whom certain information should be available. 
1. Restrictions Arising from Unclear Regulations 
The catchall provision governing public access to information 
110. Memorandum from President Obama, supra note 9. 
111. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BSEE Manual, Version No. 001, Administrative 
Series, Part 383, Chapter 15 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://perma.cc/P5B2-FZDH. 
112. 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(c) (2012). 
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reported to BSEE, 30 C.F.R. section 250.197,113 neither 
definitively gives the public access to information BSEE uses to 
assess threats to safety and the environment nor does it 
provide for a presumption of public access. Section 250.197 is 
divided into three parts: 
“Paragraphs (a) and (b). . .describe what data and 
information will be made available to the public without 
the consent of the lessee, under what circumstances, 
and in what time period. Paragraph (c). . . describes 
what data and information will be made available for 
limited inspection without the consent of the lessee, and 
under what circumstances.”114 
Paragraph (a) of section 250.197 provides that information 
submitted on BSEE forms will be available to the public upon 
submission, with the exception of enumerated entries on seven 
forms that may be withheld for a specified period of time. 
While paragraph (a) creates a mechanism by which most of the 
information submitted on BSEE forms is to be immediately 
made available to the public, it covers only a portion of the 
information that BSEE receives from offshore operators and 
relies upits analysis and decision-making.115 For instance, 
SEMS audit results and resulting Corrective Action Plans 
(“CAPs”) are not reported on BSEE forms. Thus, access to 
BSEE forms does not provide sufficient information to evaluate 
safety and environmental risks posed by offshore drilling. 
Paragraph (b) of section 250.197 addresses public access to 
lease and permit data and information that is submitted to 
BSEE in a format other than on a BSEE form. Such 
information is accessible according to a table identifying nine 
scenarios, each of which stipulates specific categories of 
information BSEE may release and the amount of time BSEE 
may delay access to the information. With respect to the scope 
of information at issue, in all but two of the scenarios the 
113. BSEE’s authority to ask reporting entities for additional copies of reports “for 
public information” is subject to the exemptions from public disclosure articulated in 
section 250.197. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.186(b). 
114. 30 C.F.R. § 250.197. 
115. Compare, e.g., BSEE OCS OPERATION FORMS, available at 
http://www.bsee.gov/About-BSEE/Doing-Business-with-BSEE/OCS-Operation-
Forms/index/ (last visited April 30, 2015) (BSEE’s list of Outer Continental _Shelf 
Operation Forms), with 30 C.F.R. 250, Subpart S (requirements for SEMS-related 
records.). 
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enumerated information that BSEE will release is limited to 
geophysical and geological data or information.116 Non-
geophysical and geological data outside of a BSEE form, such 
as the information in SEMS audit reports and CAPs, is not 
declared by the Regulations to be within the scope of material 
available to the public. However, a blanket withholding of 
documents that is not tied to a specific FOIA exemption would 
be a violation of the statute.117 Any limitation on public access 
to information should apply only to material that BSEE 
determines is subject to a FOIA exemption from disclosure, 
such as: (i) the rarely used exemption for geological and 
geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning 
wells; or (ii) the protection for trademarks and confidential 
business information. 
Even when information should be released under paragraph 
(b), in some scenarios the Regulations allow BSEE to curtail 
public access to information for two, ten, or even fifty years 
after submission or issuance of a permit.118 In other instances, 
the timing of access is even less clear as the availability of 
some information related to safety and environmental 
protection is contingent on determinations by BSEE as to 
whether public access is “necessary.”119 The Regulations, 
116. The other categories of information addressed in paragraph (b) are: (i) 
“[d]escriptions of downhole locations, operations, and equipment” related to well 
operations; and (ii) any data or information obtained from beneath unleased land as a 
result of a well deviation that has not been approved by BSEE. 30 C.F.R. § 
250.197(b)(7), (8). 
117. See, e.g., Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 7-
8 (2001) (“Upon request, FOIA mandates disclosure of records held by a federal agency 
unless the documents fall within enumerated exemptions. ‘[T]hese limited exemptions 
do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of 
the Act, [c]onsistent with the Act’s goal of broad disclosure, these exemptions have 
been consistently given a narrow compass.’”) (internal citations omitted); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (“‘[t]he mandate of the FOIA calls for broad 
disclosure of Government records,’ and for this reason we have consistently stated that 
FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed.”) (internal citations omitted). 
118. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(b)(6) (making geological data and analyzed 
geological information for leases in effect beyond the primary term specified in the 
lease available two years after the required submittal date); id. at § 250.197(b)(4) 
(making geophysical data, processed geophysical information and interpreted G&G 
information for leases still in effect available ten years after submission); id. at § 
250.197(b)(9) (making certain geophysical data available fifty years after BOEM issues 
a permit). 
119. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(b)(2) (providing that certain information “collected 
with high-resolution systems . . . to comply with safety or environmental protection 
requirements” may be released 60 days after BSEE receives the information if a 
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however, do not contain criteria for determining whether public 
access to information is “necessary.” 
Finally, paragraph (c) of section 250.197 provides limited 
public access to “G&G data and information” that BSEE uses to 
“[p]romote operational safety” or “[p]rotect the environment.” 
Such information is only available for “limited inspection. . . by 
persons with a direct interest in related BSEE decisions and 
issues in specific geographic areas, and who agree in writing” 
to keep the information reviewed confidential.120 The 
Regulations neither define “G&G data and information” nor 
provide guidance as to what constitutes a “direct interest” in a 
BSEE decision or issue. The regulatory history of paragraph (c) 
suggests that the provision is intended to relate to otherwise 
proprietary geological and geophysical data that is relevant to 
parties who are “directly affected by [BSEE] decisions 
regarding units, reservoirs, operations, environmental 
protection, field determinations, and royalty relief. . .”121 
However, in the absence of a clear mandate establishing a 
public disclosure default, this provision could be misinterpreted 
to restrict public access to non-protected information used by 
BSEE to protect safety and the environment. 
These types of delays and absence of standards governing 
decisions by BSEE personnel as to whether there is a “need” for 
or “direct interest” in information that warrants disclosure 
diminish the value of access provided by section 250.197 and 
frustrate meaningful public oversight of safety and 
environmental impacts. 
2. Restrictions Arising from Logistical Issues 
Even when information is required to be accessible by 30 
C.F.R. Part 250, there are roadblocks to retrieving it from 
BSEE. Despite BSEE’s creation of an on-line Data Center,122 
information is missing from BSEE’s website or difficult to find. 
For example: 
 
• SEMS audit reports and CAPs (examples of 
regional supervisor from the division deems it “necessary”). 
120. 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(c). 
121. 67 Fed. Reg. 46,942, 46,943 (Jul. 17, 2002). 
122. Data Center, BSEE, available at http://www.data.bsee.gov/homepg/data_center/ 
index.asp (last visited April 27, 2015). 
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documents relevant to evaluating the safety and 
environmental performance of offshore operators) are 
not posted in the Data Center, and some categories of 
information in the Data Center are available only 
from a particular BSEE office (e.g., the Gulf of Mexico 
OCS Region); 
 
• In some instances, documents that must now be filed 
with BSEE, such as H2S contingency plans, are part 
of BOEM’s electronic dataset rather than BSEE’s.123 A 
division of material between BSEE’s and BOEM’s 
websites is not, in and of itself, problematic, nor 
perhaps unexpected given the fact that the two 
agencies used to be a single entity. But the lack of 
notice to this effect hinders public access; and 
 
• Even if one knows which agency website to search, 
reports like H2S contingency plans are often not 
available as stand-alone documents, but only as 
appendices to other lengthy documents. Without a 
more refined search tool or index, retrieving 
information from BSEE’s Data Center is hit-or-miss 
and time-consuming. 
 
The type of searchable database that aggregates operating 
information submitted to multiple agencies discussed later in 
this paper would address these issues. However, such a system 
would take time to develop, so in the interim we recommend 
that BSEE expand and improve its online Data Center. For 
example, enhancing the aggregation of information and search 
capabilities, because making material available online avoids 
both the time lag in response associated with FOIA requests 
and the administrative burden such requests place on BSEE. 
Until the system is upgraded, however, it is essential for the 
public to be able to receive material directly from BSEE. To 
evaluate the ease of access to environment and safety-related 
information, we requested copies of H2S contingency plans 
123. 30 C.F.R. § 250.490(f) (2012) (requiring H2S Contingency Plans to be submitted 
to and approved by BSEE District Managers prior to beginning operations). Prior to 
October 2011, BSEE and BOEM were a single federal agency under the regulatory 
umbrella of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement 
(“BOEMRE”), and H2S Contingency Plans were submitted to BOEMRE. 
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submitted by offshore operators to BSEE, first through a series 
of informal oral and written communications with BSEE and 
then through a formal FOIA request.124 
We initiated outreach to BSEE on October 24, 2013 by 
calling BSEE’s Gulf Coast OCS Regional Office to request 
copies of H2S contingency plans filed pursuant to the 
Regulations within the last two years. BSEE representatives 
referred us to different specialists within their offices and 
BOEM, at times transferring the caller to defunct telephone 
extensions and channeling most written communication to 
generic email accounts such as GulfPublicInfo@bsee.gov and 
Foiaofficegulfofmexicoocsregion@boem.gov. In all, we requested 
the H2S contingency plans in communications with nine 
individuals as well as through the aforementioned email 
accounts to no avail. 
On November 6, 2013, a representative from BSEE’s Gulf 
Coast OCS Regional Office informed us that the requested H2S 
contingency “[p]lans are not releasable even under FOIA.”125 
When asked to specify the FOIA exemption(s) being invoked, 
the BSEE representative referred us to BOEM’s FOIA request 
email account without answering the question.126 BOEM 
responded to our inquiry by suggesting that we submit a FOIA 
request.127 
Because BSEE referred us to BOEM, we filed FOIA requests 
for H2S contingency plans with both bureaus, asking for copies 
of plans filed with either bureau, or its predecessor.128 BOEM 
responded that the documents requested “are not located in 
BOEM.”129 The regional offices of BSEE each responded 
124. H2S contingency plans, which are relevant from a safety and environmental 
perspective because releases of H2S can be fatal to humans and marine species, are 
neither submitted on a BSEE form nor explicitly excluded from public access by the 
Regulations. 
125. Email from Roberta S. McMahon, Government Information Specialist (FOIA), 
Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, BSEE, to Daniel Becker, student, Emmett Environmental 
Law & Policy Clinic (EELPC), Harvard Law School (Nov. 6, 2013) (on file with author). 
126. Email from Roberta S. McMahon, Government Information Specialist (FOIA), 
Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, BSEE, to Daniel Becker, student, EELPC, Harvard Law 
School (Nov. 8, 2013) (on file with author). 
127. Email from Jeremy Williams, BOEM, to Daniel Becker, student, EELPC, 
Harvard Law School (Dec. 2, 2013) (on file with author). 
128. This time, the request focused on plans filed more than two years before the 
date of the request to avoid any risk of the request being denied based on opportunities 
for delayed disclosure in 30 C.F.R. § 250.197(b) (2013). 
129. Letter from Steven K. Waddell, Chief, FOIA/Records Office, Gulf of Mexico OCS 
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somewhat differently to the identical FOIA request: (i) the 
Alaska region referred us to an H2S contingency plan available 
on BOEM’s website; (ii) the Pacific Region forwarded copies of 
several H2S contingency plans; and (iii) the Gulf of Mexico 
Region claimed that the request for H2S contingency plans 
sought commercial or financial information that triggered a 
“requirement” for BSEE to consult with the submitter prior to 
responding to the FOIA request. In total, the response from 
BSEE took over four months. 130 
We filed a separate FOIA request with BSEE asking for 
specific SEMS audit reports, CAPs, and completed BSEE 
Forms 0131 (on which operators submit Performance Measures 
Data). BSEE acknowledged receipt of the FOIA request and, in 
response to an inquiry two months later, informed us that (i) 
the request was still in the FOIA office queue for processing 
and, (ii) because it determined that the requested documents 
included commercial confidential information, the agency had 
notified the submitters of the reports of the request and was 
awaiting their response.131 The documents that BSEE sent us 
approximately six weeks later were so heavily redacted that 
they were largely meaningless. In redacting information, BSEE 
broadly invoked exemptions from FOIA relating to “trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information, obtained from 
a person, which is privileged or confidential” and “personnel 
and medical files and similar files, the disclosure of which 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”132 
These experiences demonstrate unnecessary roadblocks to 
the public’s timely access to information submitted to BSEE. 
The delays we experienced in receiving information exceed the 
Region, BOEM, to Jean Tanis, student, EELPC, Harvard Law School (Feb. 26, 2014) 
(on file with author). 
130. Letter from Brendan Henry, Government Information Specialist, FOIA, Alaska 
OCS Region, BSEE, to Jean Tanis, student, EELPC, Harvard Law School (Mar. 3, 
2014) (on file with author); Letter from Janice R. Hall, FOIA Officer, Pacific OCS 
Region, BSEE, to Jean Tanis, student, EELPC Harvard Law School (Mar. 25, 2014) 
(on file with author); Letter from Karen M. Miller, FOIA Officer, Gulf of Mexico OCS 
Region, BSEE, to Jean Tanis, student, EELPC, Harvard Law School (June 17, 2014) 
(on file with author). 
131. Email from Dorothy Tinker, BSEE FOIA Office, to Aladdine Joroff, Staff 
Attorney, EELPC, Harvard Law School (May 1, 2014) (on file with author). 
132. Letter from Dorothy Tinker, BSEE FOIA Office, to Aladdine Joroff, Staff 
Attorney, EELPC, Harvard Law School (June 12, 2014) (on file with author). 
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typical thirty to ninty-day comment periods on draft 
regulations, illustrating the practical impact on stakeholders 
using FOIA requests to enhance their ability to contribute to 
discussions relevant to ensuring safe and environmentally 
sound offshore drilling. Responses from BSEE are further 
slowed by the need to go back-and-forth with industry 
regarding material claimed to be business confidential. If 
BSEE required industry to submit redacted versions of reports, 
such as SEMS audit reports, along with original submissions, 
those redacted materials could be promptly forwarded as a 
placeholder in response to public inquiries while BSEE 
prepares a formal response to FOIA requests. The quality of 
responses is further impaired by inappropriately broad 
applications of FOIA exemptions. 
B. BSEE’S REGULATIONS REQUIRE COLLABORATION 
AMONG AGENCIES BUT DO NOT MANDATE 
INFORMATION-SHARING 
Numerous federal agencies play a role in offshore drilling 
oversight, but greater coordination of efforts is needed.133 
Entities with a significant role include BSEE, BOEM, EPA, 
and the USCG. Other agencies also play a role, albeit a more 
limited one, including DOT and NOAA. While the stated goals 
of many of these agencies include transparency and improved 
information management to ensure environmental 
protection,134 the accessibility of the vast amounts of 
information reported to these and other agencies remains 
limited, not only to the public but also within and between 
agencies. For instance, BSEE’s Regulations include only one 
133. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4,189 (Jan. 21, 2015) 
(establishing an Arctic Executive Steering Committee tasked, in part, with enhancing 
“coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and offices, and, where 
applicable, with State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governmental and similar 
Alaska Native organizations, academic and research institutions, and the private and 
nonprofit sectors.”). 
134. See, e.g., BSEE FY 2012-2015 Strategic Goals at a Glance, BUREAU OF SAFETY 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, http://perma.cc/BFG4-XG8J (including in 
BSEE’s strategic goals “[t]echnology and information management investment: 
revamp data systems, knowledge management, and innovation”); EPA’s Themes—
Meeting the Challenge Ahead, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://perma.cc/EMX9-VT5J (“Integrating efforts with a new commitment to 
innovation, the high-level use of data and information, partnerships, incentives, new 
and expanded constituencies, and environmental education will build momentum.”). 
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explicit example of intergovernmental collaboration, and it 
relates to cooperation between BSEE and BOEM, its sister 
division within DOI.135 No provision within the Regulations 
explicitly provides for sharing information with EPA, USCG, 
NOAA or other agencies despite the directive to BSEE, both in 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Regulations, to 
cooperate and consult with “relevant federal agencies.” 
BSEE relies on interagency agreements, e.g., MOUs and 
MOAs, to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration and 
information sharing. Examples include: (i) a 2012 MOU with 
the USCG regarding the Outer Continental Shelf and a 
subsequent MOA regarding SEMS and Safety Management, 
both of which include information sharing provisions;136 and 
(ii) an interagency agreement with the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics to develop a voluntary confidential 
near-miss reporting system for use on the Outer Continental 
Shelf.137 
Such interagency agreements for sharing information are 
hampered by limited participation, narrow coverage, lack of 
benchmarks, and vague language. Existing interagency 
agreements are often between only two agencies at a time 
and/or address discrete issues. Achieving seamless information 
sharing, however, requires a comprehensive solution that 
accounts for all of the information reported to all agencies 
involved in offshore drilling oversight, as well as making all of 
that information accessible to other interested parties.138 By 
135. 30 C.F.R. § 250.135 (“BSEE will refer a determination of unacceptable 
performance to BOEM”) (2012). 
136. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between BSEE and USCG re: 
Building a Partnership to Improve Safety and Environmental Protection, at § F (Nov. 
27, 2012) (requiring the participating agencies to “promote electronic information 
sharing,” “endeavor to synchronize information” and “exchange or otherwise make 
available . . . graphical representations depicting the geographical boundaries of each 
agency’s regional offices and commands”); Memorandum of Agreement between BSEE 
and USCG re: Safety and Environmental Management Systems and Safety 
Management Systems (BSEE/USCG MOA: OCS-07), at § C.5 (April 30, 2013) 
(providing for sharing of information related to the agencies respective “safety 
management efforts,” including “[a]ny significant finding relevant to OCS safety and 
environmental management”). Both of these documents, as well as other examples of 
collaboration between BSEE and USCG, are available at BSEE, Cooperative and 
Interagency Agreements, http://perma.cc/X8JY-28E9. 
137. BTS and BSEE to Develop Confidential Near-Miss Reporting System, U.S. 
DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, http://perma.cc/883F-W6MC. 
138. See generally U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-14-220, 
MANAGING FOR RESULTS: IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES USED TO ENHANCE 
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their very nature, bilateral agreements cannot achieve these 
goals. Progress is further hampered by agreements that do not 
clearly state the obligations they impose or provide 
mechanisms for determining whether goals are being met. For 
instance, although BSEE’s MOA with the USCG regarding 
SEMS programs directs the agencies to share information 
about their “safety management efforts,” and gives two 
examples of specific information to be shared, including “[a]ny 
significant finding relevant to OCS safety and environmental 
management,” the information sharing obligations are still 
subject to subjective agency decision-making as to which 
information is “significant” enough to share. Agreements with 
provisions that outline specific requirements and mandate 
evaluations of the collaborations’ effectiveness are likely to 
produce more effective results. 
Existing inefficiencies in information sharing can be 
illustrated by the reports that are required in the event of an 
“incident” related to offshore drilling activities. The USCG, 
EPA, and BSEE each require a report that asks for similar, if 
not duplicative, and potentially complementary information in 
the event of an incident related to offshore drilling activities.139 
However, these agencies do not have formal agreements or 
mechanisms to coordinate or streamline the information 
collected upon the occurrence of an incident. Formally 
coordinatingthe sharing of the information in these reports 
would benefit the public, industry, and the agencies themselves 
by ensuring that the reported information is consolidated. This 
in turn would enable the publication of integrated information 
through a single source that would be easy to find and access 
by interested agencies and other parties. 
One such interested agency that is often missing from the 
discussion of oversight of offshore drilling is the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Although the SEC does not 
directly regulate offshore drilling activities, it should be 
included in efforts to improve offshore drilling oversight, 
particularly as relates to information disclosure. The SEC 
COLLABORATION IN INTERAGENCY GROUPS (2014) (identifying as key practices in 
collaborative interagency mechanisms, among other factors, tools to monitor, evaluate 
and report on results and inclusion of all relevant participants). 
139. See, e.g., United States Coast Guard, Form CG-2692, Report of Marine 
Casualty; 40 C.F.R. § 112.4(a)(7) (2013); 30 C.F.R. § 250.189(h) (2014). 
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regulates all publicly-traded companies,140 including those 
engaged in offshore drilling activities. A basic principle of the 
SEC’s reporting requirements is that companies must report 
any information that is “material” to a reasonable investor in 
deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold a company’s securities. 
While the definition of what is “material” for SEC purposes is 
itself a complex and debated issue, one can reasonably assume 
that much of the information reported under the offshore 
drilling regulatory scheme concerning safety, environmental 
protection and incidents, especially when considered in the 
aggregate, amounts to what many investors would consider 
material information. 
The concept of providing the SEC better access to 
information relating to environmental impacts is not new. In a 
2004 study, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
recommended that the SEC improve the tracking and 
transparency of company filings, particularly in the realm of 
environmental disclosures.141 The SEC concurred with the 
GAO’s findings.142 Providing the SEC with access to 
information reported by offshore drillers to other federal 
agencies would be consistent with the GAO’s recommendations 
and with the SEC’s previous efforts to improve its consideration 
of environmental issues. For instance, in 1990 the SEC and 
EPA had an agreement under which EPA provided the SEC 
with quarterly enforcement-related data.143 According to the 
SEC, the value of this attempt at information sharing was 
limited due, at least in part, to the SEC’s inability to analyze 
the great volume of complex data it received from EPA.144 This 
type of problem could be addressed by integrating the SEC’s 
data needs into information collection processes so that 
material is submitted and shared in a format that matches the 
140. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a – 77mm; (2012); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a – 78kk. (2012). 
141. GAO, GAO-04-808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS 
TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION, 1 (2004), available at 
http://perma.cc/JD7A-N763 (“Environmental risks and liabilities are among the 
conditions that, if undisclosed, could impair the public’s ability to make sound 
investment decisions”). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 28. 
144. Id. For example, EPA provided facility-specific information without identifying 
the facility owner, but the SEC required the ownership information in order to make 
use of the data. 
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SEC’s role as the securities market regulator (e.g., ensuring 
that information on a spill or chemical storage is linked to the 
level of corporate identification that the SEC tracks). 
 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION 
A. ISSUE GUIDANCE CLARIFYING THAT BSEE ADOPTS 
A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF DISCLOSURE 
Although the Regulations are arguably consistent with a 
public disclosure default, they do not clearly incorporate such a 
presumption and at times contain confusing language that 
leads to inappropriate limitations on public access to non-
confidential information submitted to BSEE. To address these 
shortcomings, BSEE should issue guidance for internal and 
external purposes that confirms and clarifies how it intends to 
meet its, and the administration’s, goals of making information 
available to the public and responding to FOIA requests with a 
presumption in favor of disclosure. 
Examples of clarifications and directions that should be 
provided in such guidance include: 
 
• Clarify that BSEE (i) interprets its Regulations as 
providing a presumption of public access to 
information related to safety and the environment, 
and (ii) presumes that disclosure of such information 
is “necessary” unless demonstrated otherwise (i.e., 
BSEE employees should assume a rebuttable 
presumption of public need for information submitted 
to BSEE); 
 
• Confirm that, pursuant to paragraph (b) of section 
250.197, BSEE will release all lease and permit data 
and information not on BSEE forms except as 
specifically enumerated in that paragraph; 
 
• Confirm that the purpose of paragraph (c) of section 
250.197 is to expand public access to otherwise 
proprietary geophysical and geological data; 
 
• Direct BSEE employees to consistently exercise the 
agency’s authority to request that reporting entities 
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provide an additional “public-ready” copy of reports 
submitted to BSEE allegedly containing business 
confidential information (30 C.F.R. section 
250.186(b));145 and 
 
• Direct BSEE employees to increase the scope and 
magnitude of discretionary releases of non-
confidential material on BSEE.gov and other 
appropriate electronic sources. 
 
These suggestions are consistent with federal guidance that 
directs agencies to “exercise their discretion to make a broad 
range of records available beyond the minimum required by 
[FOIA],” and highlights their ability to make discretionary 
disclosures of information, even if it falls under a FOIA 
exemption, if not otherwise prohibited.146 
B. FACILITATE PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
THROUGH 30 C.F.R. PART 250 BY AMENDING BSEE 
FORMS 
BSEE’s Regulations are supposed to be interpreted so as to 
make information the agency collects available to the public 
unless specifically exempted from disclosure. As written, 
however, the Regulations provide for expedited access to only a 
portion of the information submitted to BSEE, namely, data 
and information submitted on BSEE forms is supposed to be 
publicly available upon submission, subject to enumerated 
exceptions. Notably, the forms represent only a subset of the 
information collected and used by BSEE in assessing safety 
and environmental impacts. BSEE should expand the scope of 
material subject to the immediate public disclosure 
requirement in paragraph (a) of section 250.197 by instructing 
operators to attach additional safety and environment-related 
information to existing BSEE forms. Given the routine use of 
electronic submissions, attaching additional documents to a 
form would not be burdensome. 
145. BSEE should conduct periodic, random inspections of “public-ready” 
submissions to ensure that claims of protected information have a legal basis and that 
redactions are not inappropriately broad. 
146. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE 11–12, 686 
(2004). 
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Where, however, electronic submissions are not available or 
the norm, referenced documents could be deemed incorporated 
by the submitter’s signature if not physically or electronically 
attached to the relevant BSEE form. Although amending 
BSEE forms in this manner is not required for public access to 
information currently submitted in other formats, it would be a 
means of implementing the directive, recommended above, to 
expand the scope of material that should be promptly made 
available to the public, including via BSEE’s public website. 
Examples of BSEE forms that could be modified include 
Well Activity Reports (BSEE-0133), Applications for Permits to 
Modify (BSEE-0124), and End of Operations Reports (BSEE-
0125). For instance, Well Activity Reports, which operators 
must submit weekly or daily depending on where they are 
drilling,147 could be amended by adding a line item asking 
operators to list information related to safety and 
environmental protection otherwise submitted to BSEE prior 
to or in the relevant reporting period. With respect to daily or 
weekly reports, operators would only need to attach new 
information in the first applicable reporting period; 
information would not need to be re-submitted on a weekly or 
daily basis. This direction would be accompanied by a non-
inclusive list of responsive information, which would then be 
attached to or incorporated as part of form BSEE-0133 itself. 
Amending BSEE forms in this manner would not increase 
the amount or type of information collected by BSEE, but 
would merely change the submission process and, potentially, 
the categories of information readily available for public 
access. Because there would be no “substantive or material 
modification” to BSEE’s previously-approved collection of 
information, the agency could proceed by issuing a Notice to 
Lessees (“NTL”) without triggering obligations under the 
Paperwork Reduction Act.148 BSEE issues NTLs as guidance 
documents to “clarify, supplement, or provide more detail” 
about requirements in the Regulations and to “outline what 
147. 30 C.F.R. § 250.468 (2014) (requiring operators drilling in the (i) Gulf of Mexico 
OCS Region or (ii) Pacific or Alaska OCS Regions to submit Well Activity Reports on a 
weekly and daily basis respectively). 
148. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3507(h)(3) (2012) (providing that, once the Office of 
Management and Budget (“OMB”) has approved a collection of information, an agency 
may not make a “substantive or material” modification to the collection without OMB 
approval.) 
 
                                               
48
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol5/iss1/3
2015]OFFSHORE DRILLING INDICATORS & REGULATORY REFORMS 63 
[reporters] must provide as required information in [their] 
various submissions.”149 Historically, BSEE has determined 
that many of its NTLs, including ones that designate the 
format and timing of submissions of information, do not 
impose additional information collection requirements subject 
to the Paperwork Reduction Act.150 
C. DEVELOP A SEARCHABLE ONLINE DATABASE 
THAT AGGREGATES OPERATOR SUMBITTED 
INFORMATION 
The information collected by the various federal agencies 
that oversee offshore drilling is fragmented, hindering efficient 
information management and effective analysis of the impacts 
of offshore drilling. A searchable, shared database would 
reduce reporting burdens on industry and improve oversight. 
Access to shared data can lead to more informed and 
innovative analysis and ideas; as noted in the context of 
scientific data, “[t]he power of digital information to catalyze 
progress is limited only by the power of the human mind.”151 
Even agencies that do not directly regulate offshore drilling, 
such as the SEC, would benefit from greater access to 
streamlined data relevant to the safety and environmental 
impacts of offshore drilling. Pursuant to its mandate to 
“cooperate and consult with . . . relevant Federal agencies” in 
the regulation of offshore oil and gas operations, BSEE and 
BOEM should take action to facilitate information sharing 
within and among agencies with a role or interest in the 
oversight of offshore drilling. 
To address the current deficiencies in agency information 
sharing, BSEE and BOEM should reach out to and collaborate 
with other relevant agencies to establish a centralized 
electronic reporting system capable of aggregating operator-
submitted information in a searchable online database. (This 
outreach should include the SEC, which should participate 
with other federal agencies in devising the mechanisms for 
sharing information so that it can specify its information 
149. 30 C.F.R. § 250.103. (2014). 
150. See BSEE Notices to Lessees and Operators, http://perma.cc/56NR-ARR4 
(listing active BSEE NTLs issued from 1998-2014). 
151. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON DIGITAL DATA, HARNESSING THE POWER OF 
DIGITAL DATA FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 4 (2009). 
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needs.) The database should aggregate all information 
submitted by offshore operators that is relevant to safety and 
environmental performance and be made accessible to all 
federal regulators and, except for information that is 
confidential, the general public.152 BSEE could use a multi-
agency MOA to develop such a centralized, electronic system 
for collecting and processing information from regulated 
offshore drilling entities. 
A multi-agency MOA could build on current, often bilateral, 
information-sharing efforts between agencies by expanding the 
scope of existing agreements and establishing deadlines for 
facilitating improved information sharing and access. In 
particular, the signatories to the MOA could: 
 
(i) Compile a list of information reportable by offshore 
drilling entities, organize such data by searchable 
parameters,153 and identify and address any gaps or 
overlaps in reporting requirements.154 In compiling 
this list of information, the agencies should identify 
which material is confidential and specify that the 
rest is accessible to the public. Such an exercise 
would help address ambiguities in BSEE’s 
regulations as to which information it intends to 
withhold from public access and for how long; 
 
(ii) Develop a computer application that provides a 
streamlined method by which offshore facilities can 
152. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) and the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Material Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) maintain searchable online 
databases that could serve as models. See Mine Data Retrieval System, MINE SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, http://perma.cc/KA6J-BDEC (containing information 
gathered from various MSHA systems); Pipeline Operator Information, PIPELINE AND 
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, http://perma.cc/KKE4-3YKV 
(collecting operator information from multiple sources including operator reported and 
internal PHMSA data). 
153. Possible search parameters might include collection agency, date of submission, 
type of disclosure (voluntary or mandatory), and circumstance of disclosure (periodic or 
incident based). 
154. The identification of reporting gaps and overlaps may be informed by the work 
of the recently established Arctic Executive Steering Committee, which was tasked 
with establishing a working group to “identify potential areas of overlap between and 
within agencies with respect to implementation of Arctic policy and strategic priorities 
and provide recommendations to increase coordination and reduce any duplication of 
effort . . .”). Exec. Order No. 13689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4189 (Jan. 21, 2015). 
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submit all required information electronically. This 
system could include a graphical user interface that 
would allow users to enter information for multiple 
reports simultaneously. The system could also allow 
facilities to submit confidential information 
separately. (Figure 1 below presents a conceptualized 
model for a graphical user interface screen that, 
while not intended to be a final product, provides an 
illustration of the idea); and 
 
Figure 1: Conceptualized GUI Model 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Create a searchable database that includes all 
reported information for use by all interested 
regulators and, with respect to non-confidential 
information, all other stakeholders and members of 
the public. 
 
While conceptual and design input from all relevant 
agencies should be obtained early in the process, the computer 
application and database could be developed in stages, 
beginning with a pilot project to test the system and 
incorporate stakeholder feedback. A possible funding 
mechanism for the development and maintenance of such a 
system would be license and permit fees. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Regulators, investors, affected communities and other 
members of the general public who are interested in evaluating 
the environmental performance of different operators have 
some but not enough useful information at their disposal. Data 
regarding an operator’s civil and administrative violations and 
the well control incidents, explosions, fires, oil releases, 
reportable injuries, and fatalities that occur at its facilities are 
already publicly available on BSEE’s website. This information 
provides important insights into an operator’s past safety and 
environmental performance and the prospective risk its 
operations pose. 
Although existing information can provide important 
insights, the implementation of robust environmental and 
safety indicators requires improved access to information 
generated by operators. For example, BSEE should require 
operators to report their SPPE maintenance backlog, average 
kick response time, and certain LOPC events that are 
currently not reported. BSEE should also conduct periodic 
surveys of an operator’s personnel to determine the strength of 
the operator’s safety culture. This additional information will 
provide important new insights into the safety and 
environmental performance of offshore operators. 
BSEE should also take steps to improve public access to, and 
inter- and intra-agency sharing of, information that the agency 
already collects from entities involved in offshore drilling. 
Facilitating access to information is a critical step toward 
effective oversight of offshore drilling and protection of human 
health and the environment. Much can be done to achieve this 
goal without creating additional substantive requirements for 
or burdens on the regulated community, and would represent a 
significant step by BSEE towards meeting its mandates to 
proactively make information public and to cooperate and 
coordinate with other federal agencies in the regulation and 
oversight of offshore oil and gas operations. 
Alleviating the need for the public to proceed under the often 
lengthy FOIA process, and providing regulators immediate 
access to information collected by other agencies, would 
improve the ability of stakeholder and regulators alike to 
monitor and assess the safety and environmental performance 
of offshore operators. Such increased and timely access to 
information is needed to help displace the “culture of 
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complacency” that the National Commission identified in the 
wake of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy.155 
155. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at ix, 293. 
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